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PART II
FRAMING THE SOLUTION: FACTS AND LAW
CHAPTER 4
THE DAYTON AGREEMENT
To end the war, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), more formally known as the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP),  was initialed in Dayton, Ohio on
21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1996 (henceforth, Dayton or the Dayton
Accords). The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) remained an intact single country, but one with
an extremely weak central government and divided into two entities - the Republika Srpska (RS - an almost
entirely Serb area) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) populated by areas with
concentrations of Bosniacs, other areas dominated by Croats and a few mixed areas. in November of
1995. 
The location for the signing indicates the important role that the United States played in bringing
about the agreement. The Dayton Accords provide a political, military, economic and demographic solution
to the violent conflict begun four years earlier. The demographic solution refers to the resolution of the
problem of 1.3 million refugees and over 1 million displaced persons. After considering the other parts of
the agreement in very general terms, I will go into the details of the agreement on the arrangements for the
displaced population.
In general, the agreement is founded on a fundamental principle of diplomacy - creative ambiguity.
Modern science and philosophy may teach the virtues of clear and distinct ideas, the values of avoiding
ambiguity and equivocation, but that is definitely not the foundation for the art of diplomacy as historically
practiced. Whenever snags are met between the contending parties - or, for that matter, between one or
more of the contending parties and the peace broker as well - if those differences are too difficult to resolve
at the time, they are papered over with vague language. This is clearest in noting the political solution which
calls for maintaining the integrity and unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina when, in fact, the political settlement
endorses ethnic division both in the state as a whole and even within the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the part of the divided country allocated to the Bosniacs and the Croats. In other words, as
in the Vance-Owen proposal in 1993, as in the American diplomatically brokered deal that Clinton vetoed,
ethnic cleansing is, in fact, condoned by the very political arrangement provided in the agreement. 
Of course, the agreement says no such thing. This effect, however, is obvious in the political terms.
This is not simply my own interpretation. The prestigious World Bank, without using such unqualified
language, effectively endorses this characterization of the Dayton Accords. “The agreement contains
intentional ambiguities on many points, and avoids partition by calling for the three parties to participate in
a highly decentralized relationship. It lays out a structure that combines two entities - the Moslem-Croat
‘Federation f Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and the Serb ‘Republika Srpska’ (RS) under the aegis of an
unusually weak state.” (World Bank 1998, Precis, 1) The reality is that the central state was left with very
few functions.
The central government does not have the power to tax or raise revenues nor to have a state army.
It is responsible for foreign trade, customs policy, monetary policy, controls the Central Bank (in effect,
only a Currency Board for the next five years since it may not extend credit by creating money and the new
convertible bank notes are pegged to the Deutchmark), manages international communications and inter-
city transport and air traffic. In effect, BiH is an economic union of independent states which have not been
recognized as such. The central government is given the Central Bank, with the power to issue money,
indicating that all we have is an economic union, and a very weak one at that for there is no power to
enforce its use. RS could conceivably continue to use FRY issued money, while the sections of the
Federation dominated by Croats continue to use Croatian currency. The central state carries the
responsibility for foreign policy but little bsis for formulating a common policy. Its Prime Minister and
Ministers are triumverates based on ethnic politics or rotating and equal allocations of ministerial posts. 
The State has a National Assembly with 42 seats, 19 held by the Party of Democratic Action
(SDA) controlled by the Bosniacs, 8 held by the Croation Democratic Community (CDC) and 9 by the
Serbian democratic Party (SDS) with a half dozen other seats shared equally among three minor parties.
All of the major parties are ethnically based parties. In the Upper House of Peoples, the three major parties
each have 5 of the 15 seats. Legislation requires the approval of both houses, and a triumvirate Presidency
shared among a Bosniac, a Croat and a Serb, the last to be elected from RS. The Council of Minsters has
two chairs rotating on a weekly basis, and a Vice-Chair coming from the third ethnic group. Similarly, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economics, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs
and Communications are shared among the three ethnic groups. At the Peace Implementation Council
(PIC) meeting in Bonn in December 1997, the Office of the Special Representative (OSR) was given the
power to cut through impasses in decisions and make decisions when the political situation was stalled (such
as over the design of the new currency, the new BiH flag, common license plates, etc.).
The weakness of the central government is clearest when it comes to the issue of the
monopolization of force. The central government not only lacks such a monopoly, standard in any central
government, but does not even have the power to have its own army. All enforcement of laws is left in the
hands of the two Entities. That is, the two main warring parties, the Serbs versus the Croats and Bosniacs,
are left with separate polities, each with its own army, and both wrapped in the veneer of a central
government with little power and many opportunities to engage in conflict on ethnic lines, but with the
demand in place that they cannot do so through the use of outright warfare. Each Entity, based explicitly
on ethnic politics, is given the power to enforce virtually all the terms of the Dayton Agreement, including
those about absorption of the returning populations. “The treaty relies primarily on the Parties for
enforcement, although it was perfectly clear from the start that the will to comply was not present on all
sides.”   (ICG, “Dayton: Two Years On,” November 1997, 12)
The Dayton Agreement does not provide for a real peace agreement, in the sense of the resumption
of full normal relations between two previously warring parties. Instead, the DPA makes provision for a
Cold Peace, and even within those types of agreements, this one is set in the high Arctic. The agreement
is mainly about not reverting to open and all-out war, not about being at peace. Of course, it was hoped
that by means of the DPA, conditions would be established that would gradually move the two Entities into
a more positive form of peace arrangement, but the opportunities for conflict, in fact, the incentives for
conflict given the ethnic basis of each of the parties and the political responsibilities allocated to each, the
many concrete issues that could divide them, especially when it came to demographic issues interconnected
with politics , make it difficult to envisage the new resurrected BiH functioning as any real political entity
ever. As the ICG described the agreement, “Dayton is more theory than anything else.”1
The fact is, the wars were started with two objectives: redrawing the political map of former
Yugoslavia so that the Serbs controlled the political territory in which they were both majorities and
significant minorities, and to engage in ethnic cleansing to remove populations from that territory that could
threaten that power and the envisaged Serbian political control. Both tasks were accomplished by the war,
though not as fully as the Serbs would have liked on the political level, nor, in the end, as extensively as they
had achieved on the demographic side at the pinnacle of Serb power during the war. This was particularly
true in Croatia where the Serbs lost all of their initial gains and it was the Serbs who were forced to flee.
The reality is that ethnic cleansing was not prevented when it first occurred and 80,000 Croats were
cleared out of Serb dominated areas of Croatia. This principle of ethnically dominated and virtually
ethnically monopolized political entities was not reversed when Croatia recaptured the territory and 200-
300,000 Serbs were themselves ethnically cleansed from Croatian territory, even though the peace treaty
between Croatia and FRY makes provision for the possibility of just such a reversal. The reality is that the
international community - not the warring parties responsible for enforcing the terms of the treaty -
attempted to snatch an ideological victory for their collective rhetorical belief in tolerance and ethnic
pluralism out of the jaws of defeat, at the very least, rhetorically. “Because those campaigns (of ethnic
cleansing) were not halted at the outset by other states that could have stopped them, over time they proved
grotesquely successful.”   (ICG, “Dayton: Two Years On,” November 1997, 12)
This reality of the split in contrast with the rhetoric of reversing ethnic cleansing is built into the treaty
by the few tools provided for translating an ideology of pluralism into reversing the facts on the ground, and
the alternative solution for which the treaty makes for provision  - accepting the reality of the ethnic cleaning
as a fait accompli.  All this is evident in the articles of the DPA dealing with the return of the refugees and
displaced persons.
Those provisions are contained in Annex 7, entitled the Agreement on Refugees and Displaced
Persons. In general, as the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees
(CRPC) depicts the terms of the DPA in its  information Bulletin on the Annex, “The fundamental principle
of the Dayton Peace Agreement is the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their home of
origin.” The Annex does not impose a specific obligation on the parties to the conflict to reverse ethnic
cleansing. It makes it theoretically possible by giving the refugee or displaced person a right of return.
But as I have discussed in the previous chapter and in many places in previous articles2, the “right
of return” is a rhetorical right unless it has attached to it an effective enforcement mechanism. Further, the
right has no reality unless the individual is a member of the political entity in which he or she is said to enjoy
such rights. When the political entity in question was set up, in part, to deny such claims of membership,
indeed, explicitly to exclude such persons from membership, the right is a rhetorical sop to the international
community and an illusion for the refugees and displaced. It ends up postponing the resettlement of the
refugees and displaced rather than finding a permanent solution for them. And it sets in place the long term
prospect of creating a group of refugee warriors wedded and committed to reversing the result of any
accord which leaves these refugees and displaced persons in limbo.
But does this not misrepresent the terms of the agreement? After all, no agreement should force
refugees and displaced people to return. The agreement simply says they have the right to return and the
right to have their property restored; they are not obliged to do so. The article merely offers an alternative-
compensation - if they do not exercise that right. Specifically, Article 1.1 states: “All refugees and displaced
persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored
to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated
for any property that cannot be restored to them.” 
Yes, the article says precisely that. But what is meant by what is said? Does it mean the refugees
have the right to return and get their property back and that such a right will be enforced by the state with
the power of both law and the control of violence to enforce such rights? 
Not at all. For the political Entities - the Federation and Republika Srpska - are not obligated to
guarantee to exercise of such rights. Rather,  the only obligation on the polities is not to interfere with the
exercise of such rights. Article 1.4 explicitly states that, “The parties shall not interfere with the returnees’
choice of destination,” and then continues as follows: “ nor shall they compel them to remain in or move to
situations of serious danger or insecurity, or to areas lacking in the basic infrastructure necessary to resume
a normal life.” The political entities are not only not obligated to enforce the exercise of such rights, but are
obligated not to enforce such rights if the enforcement will mean that the individuals when they return will
be at risk or if the necessary infrastructure for a normal life is not in place. Now the source of risk, as it has
always been historically following peace agreements, does not come primarily from the central state, nor
even a political part of the federation, but from vigilante actions. If the peace agreement were serious about
the exercise of such rights, then the Entities would have been given the obligation to prevent and inhibit
vigilante actions that would create such insecurity. Instead, the political entities are specifically instructed
to ensure that the refugees and internally displaced are not to be returned to places where their security
would be in danger otherwise the actions of the states would be interpreted as coercive and as an effort
to deny the refugee or displaced person freedom of choice. 
If that were not enough, the states are obligated not to enforce such rights if the area is lacking in
normal infrastructure. What is normal infrastructure? It includes the provision water and sanitation, the
provision of electricity and of roads, etc. But infrastructure also includes the provision of schools for the
children of returnees. The DPA does not obligate the political entities to provide such infrastructure. Quite
the reverse. It says that the political entities would be guilty of enforcing return - which the terms of
agreement explicitly forbid - if the infrastructure were not available.
Finally, Article 1.4 puts the provision of choice within the context of a larger principle - the
preservation of the family unit. The Article in full states: “Choice of the destination shall be up to the
individual or family, and the principle of the unity of the family shall be preserved. The parties shall not
interfere with the returnees’ choice of destination, nor shall they compel them to remain in or move to
situations of serious danger or insecurity, or to areas lacking in the basic infrastructure necessary to resume
a normal life.” In other words, the reference to choice is made in relation to either the individual or the
family. What happens if one individual wants to return - the husband or an elderly parent - but the rest of
the family, in particular, a mother does not because she is worried about the safety of her children or their
future opportunities in a region where they would be minorities and where the dominant majority specifically
fought a war to ethnically cleanse their like from the area? Since the reference to choice is an alternative
one - either the individual or the family has the choice, but the supreme principle for determining choice is
based n the integrity of the family, effectively the determination of choice depends on the choice by the
family as a whole and not by a single individual in it.
Further, does not this clause simply mean that “humanitarian return” is endorsed? That is, in cases
where families have been split up and one part of the family did not flee and another part did, then the part
of the family that fled should have the right to return to rejoin the family left behind? This provision is normal
in cases where mass return is not expected but where there is a desire to provide for exceptions,
particularly in cases of family separation. In such cases, though return in general may not be feasible, stress
is placed on ensuring that exceptions will be made for humanitarian cases o family reunification. And though
this may have been contemplated and have been the motive for the wording, the way the article has been
phrased also makes the option available for movement the other way - the movement of those left behind
to join the rest of the family in exile where those left behind will feel insecure or where the normal
infrastructure is not available to them. If the emphasis was to be on humanitarian return explicitly, the
phrasing would have been different and would have included provision for an arbitration body to consider
claims for humanitarian return. Of course, the inclusion of such a stipulation would mean openly accepting
that large scale return was not feasible or possibly even desirable, and this is one item that the DPA does
not seem to want is to explicitly acknowledge.
This interpretation of the provisions of Dayton is further supported by other references in the
Appendix and in its explanation. The CRPC, in its information bulletin on its functions, states that, “Where
claimants cannot or do not wish to return into possession of their property immediately, a CRPC decision
gives them authoritative confirmation of their rights in the form of a legally binding document which can be
retained for future use.” In other words, the CRPC contemplates the inability to exercise the right as well
as the desire not to do so and makes provision for the protection of property rights, even when the right
to return cannot be protected. Further, Article XI makes clear the purpose of the certificate. It is not only
a matter of retention for the exercise of return at a later date when the security situation is better or where
another family in occupancy has been moved out. The Article provides that, “Claims may be for return of
the property or for just compensation in lieu of return.” (My italics)
The Commission is not only given the power to give a property certificate which can be used to
make a compensation claim, but the DPA gives the Commission a great deal more power - the power to
facilitate creating a market for the sale and/or exchange or lease of properties. Further, it is not only a
facilitating power; it is an action power. The Commission is given power to effect property transfers or
exchanges. Article XII.5 explicitly states that, “The Commission shall have the power to effect any
transactions necessary to transfer or assign title, mortgage, lease, or otherwise dispose of property with
respect to which a claim is made, or which is determined to be abandoned.” The provision goes even
further. The Commission can assume from the holder of the certificate the right to itself engage in sales,
rentals, leases provided the holder of the property has been compensated or where the property has been
determined to have been abandoned - that is, no claim, under the terms of making such claims, for
restoration of property rights has been filed - either because the owner is now dead or because the owner
neglected to make such a property claim. As the Article goes on to say, “In particular, the Commission may
lawfully sell, mortgage, or lease real property to any resident or citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to
either Party, where the lawful owner has sought and received compensation in lieu of return, or where the
property is determined to be abandoned in accordance with local law.” In other word, a great deal of
attention and explicit text has been built into Dayton to provide for the legal transfer of property or the final
settlement of property ownership within a reasonable period of time. 
What is even more noticeable in these provisions is the great deal of attention to the provisions and
mechanisms for protecting property rights in comparison to the lack of real provisions and mechanisms for
exercising in an effective manner the right of return. For example, 
Article XII.6 states that, “In cases in which the claimant is awarded compensation in lieu of return of the
property, the Commission may award a monetary grant or a compensation bond for the future purchase
of real property. The Parties welcome the willingness of the international community assisting in the
construction and financing of housing in Bosnia and Herzegovina to accept compensation bonds awarded
by the Commission as payment, and to award persons holding such compensation bonds priority in
obtaining that housing.” The agreement even envisions the Commission buying property with paper rather
than money by issuing bonds, and then allowing those bonds to be used as script in the purchase of other
property presumably in areas where that ethnic group is in the majority and where the displaced person
may presently be residing. 
But is this not a distorted interpretation of the Dayton agreement? After all, Article 1.1 of the
framework agreement explicitly states that, “The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an
important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Note what it does not say.
It does not say it is the  objective, or even one of the  objectives. It is an objective, one that does not
exclude relocation or other contrary objectives to return to homes. What DPA does do is put the empty
rhetoric up front and leave the provisions for filling other mandates in the details of other articles such as
those cited above which make extensive provision for relocation rather than return to original homes.
This may appear to be a flimsy answer. After all, DPA goes on further to say in Article 1.5  that
the Parties “call upon States that have accepted refugees to promote the early return of refugees consistent
with international law.”  This seems to suggest that even third part states are responsible for promoting the
return of refugees. 
This clause is the most ironic. On the one hand, it can be interpreted to mean that countries such
as Canada, which is not even a signatory to the agreement, is in breach of its provisions because it is not
engaged in promoting the repatriation of refugees to whom it had granted landed status, what is, in effect,
the right to obtain citizenship in Canada provided the person landed does not engage in criminal or other
nefarious activities. Secondly, it calls upon third party states to promote return, but not to promote return
to places of origin. In other words, as long as the refugees are back in their home country, even if they have
been relocated and have not been able to return to their original homes, the third part states have fulfilled
their obligations. Thirdly, and most importantly, this provision gets third party states off the hook of possibly
being accused of breaching the non-refoulement  provisions of international law, which has been
interpreted to mean that states are guilty of refoulement  of refugees if they return refugees to their
homeland where they are not safe in their home areas. Thus, in Canadian case law, Canada grants refugee
status to Sri Lankan Tamils from the North if they are judged to be in fear of persecution if they return to
their home areas even if it is safe to return such refugees to Colombo, for example. By this clause, Germany
is protected from any accusations of breaching international refugee law and forcing the return of refugees
even when they cannot return to their homes. 
Thus, this clause makes it even clearer that although return to homes is a goal of the DPA, return
in general is the supreme goal even if it means relocating the refugees and displaced persons from areas that
were not their original homes. The DPA is a framework for relocating the bulk of the refugees and
displaced persons and is not primarily a framework for returning refugees and displaced persons to their
homes.
One final note is necessary on methodology and hermeneutics. The method of analysis used here
goes by the name of “textualism”. Basically, instead of going into the mind set of the drafters - their
intentions,  norms, anticipated consequences and the conditions as they perceived them to discern the
meaning of the provisions of the agreement, and/or  instead of contextualizing the document historically and
making clear the situation which the drafters faced, the prime basis for determining the meaning of the
agreement is the analysis of the text itself according to its plain meaning.3 It is the method that I have used
to unpack the meanings of DPA, but, as anyone familiar with my writings would know, it is not a method
I generally employ or endorse. However, in cases of documents that are deliberately vague, that are
intended by some parties to carry out certain objectives, and by other parties, to reverse those objectives,
then it is not the intentions of the parties in writing the document that count, but the residual meaning
contained in the lowest common denominator detrmined to result from those negotiations, the text as it
stands.
I introduce this discussion of method within the body of the chapter, rather than in an endnote,
because texts which are deliberately equivocal are open to such opposite interpretations; after all, creative
ambiguity was involved in writing the text in the first place. Certainly the DPA can be read as endorsing and
putting forth as a prime objective the reversal of ethnic cleansing by returning refugees and displaced
persons to their homes. My claim is not that the agreement is not open to such interpretation or that the
interpretation that I have given of its provisions is the only one. The issue here is not what interpretation can
be made of the text of the agreement, since that interpretation and its opposite are both feasible, but what
interpretation is more plausible given the actual wording, the clauses actually included and those which
could have been included but are not when weighing which meaning is the more likely.
Textualism is the most appropriate method when we more or less know the intentions of at least
some of the signatories - to make ethnic cleansing stick and to consolidate political gains - the Serbs and
Croats - while the intentions of others, such as the Bosniacs, are to reverse such gains, if possible, through
the use of ‘right of return’, while the intention of the United States was most likely, at the least, to endorse
the principle of reversing ethnic cleansing and, if feasible, without leading to war, in practice reversing it,
then the issue is generally not to discern intentions, but to discern how effective the text has articulated each
of the competing intentions. Therefore, while it would be of great historical interest to have interviewed the
negotiators extensively and to even have the notes and private minutes of the drafters as well as the minutes
of the negotiations and  submitted drafts of the document by the various parties and the changes they went
through, in this case I do not think that this process is of prime importance. 
That is not because I discount the meaning and importance of intentions and contexts in discerning
meaning. It is just that in this case the meanings seem all-too-easy to discern. If I am mistaken on that count
- and that is very possible - then this procedure might be inappropriate. But many different interpretations
of intentions and context could yield the same equivocal and vague results based on compromises between
and among contending positions. So even though a different set of intentions and a somewhat different
context than the one I discerned might be found, it is quite likely that the results would be the same, for in
the end one would have to rely on the most plausible interpretation.
Thus, this is a method opposed to relativism, opposed to saying that a text can mean anything you
want it to mean. Anyone can take advantage of ambiguities to read into a text their own meaning. But if that
is all that texts are to be used for, they are not worth the paper they are written on, and those with the guns
and grenades are just as capable of reading in their own meaning as the humanitarians, but with far more
lethal effect. Mor importantly, such readings make the principle of the rule of law meaningless, for the
abusers of that principle believe that it is might not right that determines the interpretation of law rather than
principle of justice and the importance of the rule of law as the highest principle. Raeding into texts one’s
own meaning, even for a lofty moral purpose, is merely the complement to reading into text one’s own
meaning for the most nefarious of purposes. Both make a mockery of standards and of legal texts as a basis
for action.
In this, and perhaps in this only, I share a common vision with the users of textualism with whom
I would usually considered to be at odds. For my purposes in the use of textualism is not to claim to discern
an original meaning. Quite the reverse. I would claim that in a peace document, there is no original meaning
because there is no singular original intent that can be read through the plain language. My purpose, further,
is not the conservative one of preventing change. It is intended to facilitate change, effective change for the
victims, rather than perpetuating impasses between humanitarians and power brokers in which
humanitarianism becomes war persued through other means where almost always it is the humanitarians
as well as the victims who will be the losers. My purpose is not the conservative one of embedding rights
so that they can never be interfered with. That is the cause of both the upholders of universal theories of
rights, of legal conservative employers of textualist methodology and of might is right theories, only the rights
each group has in mind refer to very different sets. I am not an essentialist and do not believe that morality
is embedded in a divine set of received rights. Rights are products of long historical fights and the processes
of institutionalizing them in political and legal systems. There is no ahistorical a priori existing set of rights.
In other words, I endorse the use of textualism in this case precisely because I am an historicist. 
For parties ending a war, particularly a civil war where some sides had the support of adjacent
states and, hence, emerged as relative winners, the peace agreement is their substitute for a constitution,
particularly when the document has bound them together, against the will of many if not most of them, in
a common, however weak, polity. Ending a war means not only the exhaustion of the parties and the
abandonment of further potential gains at acceptable costs. It also means establishing that differences can
be settled according to a common set of rules. It means demonstrating that the document can be interpreted
to have rules which bind everyone. Reading into the document only your own interpretation defeats such
a purpose. This means that it cannot be treated as apon-ended document for discerning any possible
meaning, but must be used to establish a common plausible meaning. In other words, reading into the
document one particular meaning on the basis of a prior set of moral commitments in direct contravention
to the most plausible reading of the text undrcuts the far more important gaol of establishing the rule of law
and a common set of rules as the basis for resolving disputes instead of resorting to violence.
In a sense, this use of textualism seems even more extreme than Scalia’s admittedly very
conservative methodology since even he acknowledges that discerning intent and context becomes
appropriate when the text is vague and unclear. In fact, the reverse principle is at work here compared to
Scalia. For it is precisely when the text is deliberately vague that I argue that textualism is appropriate,
whereas, in most cases, where parties ostensibly shared a common goal, then intentions and context are
critical not only to understanding the goal, but the conditions, standing norms and anticipated consequences
which limit the application of the intentions and, therefore, allow looser or more creative interpretations of
the text to be made. But where texts are deliberately the products of compromise and obfuscation, then
it is the plain meaning of words and the most plausible interpretation that is most appropriate, not simply
because there is a resumption of war if the wrong interpretation is made which angers one of the parties,
but primarily because the salvation of the lives of victims should not depend on the illusions and ideals of
those of good will who were not parties to the agreement but who have such a great influence in carrying
out the provisions of the agreement. For historically illusory readings will certainly be possible, but they will
have enormous difficulty in being translated into reality. And it will be over the bodies and suffering of the
victims that the war between good and evil will be fought, not nearly as viciously as wars between one evil
and another, perhaps lesser one, but nevertheless quite, if not equally, lethal.
Thus, it is not on the basis of some vaunted heavenly neutrality that I espouse the use of textualist
methods in interpreting peace agreements in these contexts, but because I am morally committed to
resolving the plight of the victims in as efficacious and effective way as possible with the least compromise
to my own principles, while not allowing those principles to stand in the way of a resolution even if it means
that the villains are allowed to win more or less, and that ethnic cleansing will, in effect, determine the shape
of the political map. Better the villains win than that the victims continue to be losers for no discernible
benefit whatsoever. This means that interpretation requires reasonable judgement and not the mechanical
application of some preestablished set of virtues and moral principles.
My preference for textualist interpretations of text is intended to be the exceptional method rather
than the standard one, particularly applicable to texts which are products of compromises and written in
deliberately vague language. Most importantly, this method, unlike its normal users who claim to avoid
imposing their own morality on a text but take the text to be supplying its own morality, is utilized because
of the morality I espoused in Chapter 2, humanitarian realism, humanitarianism which does not believe in
fighting losing causes over the backs of its victims but in ensuring that those people do not continue to be
victims, only this time in the name of a higher ideology such as pluralism or multiculturalism or democracy.
1. This statement was originally made at a meeting with senior UNHCR officials and has been widely quoted since.
To the best of my knowledge, it was first quoted in a report by Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina, “Who’s
living in my House? Obstacles to the Safe Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons,” April 1997, fn. 15.  It was
requoted in the ICG report cited in the previous quotation, “Dayton: Two Years On,” November 1997, 40.
2.  Cf., for example,  Howard Adelman, "Refugees: The Right of Return" in Group Rights, ed. Judith Baker,
University of Toronto Press, 1994, 164-185. 
3. Supreme Court Justice of the United States, Antonin Scalia,  is an upholder of the doctrine of legal textualism, a
mode of interpretation which now dominates Supreme Court decisions in that country. For a precise defense of its
theory, see the published version of  his 1995 Tanner lectures at Princeton University and his replies to his critics
contained in, A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton: Princeton University
Press. My use of this technique here should not be interpreted to mean that I generally endorse textualism as a prime
method of interpretation.
